The purpose of this study is to reconcile the conflicting earlier conclusions about the relationship between Fortune ratings and subsequent stock returns and explore the behavior that underlies that relationship. We study Fortune ratings published during and returns through March 2006, a period longer than those studied earlier, and find that stocks of despised companies beat stocks of admired companies during the overall period. 1 Surveys were published in January during 1983 -1990 , February during 1991 -1994 and March during 1995 -2006 . We match the list of companies in the Fortune survey with list of companies in the CRSP database. Approximately 7% of the companies in the surveys are not publicly traded or are missing return data on CRSP
Returns
The mean scores of companies in some industries, such as the 6.44 of the Engineering and Management Services industry, are higher on average than those of other industries, such as the 5.55 of the Primary Metals industry. Ranking companies with no adjustment for such differences favors companies in higher scoring industries.
We calculate the mean score of companies in each industry in the 1983-2006 surveys and define the industry-adjusted score of a company as the difference between its score in a given survey and the mean score of companies in its industry. We construct Industry- 
Private information or noise?
We know from Fama and French (1992) and earlier work that small-cap value stocks provided higher returns over long periods of time than stocks of large-cap growth stocks. Statman (1986, 1995) argued that the common growth-value and large-small scales are imperfect measures of a scale that ranges from good to bad, admired to despised, such as the scale offered by the Fortune ratings. They found that companies that ranked high on the Fortune scale were large-cap growth stocks. Clarke and Statman (1994) added that the large-small and growth-value characteristics are only two of many characteristics that distinguish admired companies from despised ones. They studied the relationship between Fortune ratings and BARRA characteristics and found that companies that ranked high on the Fortune scale also ranked high on size and success and low on book-to-price, variability in markets, earnings variability, financial leverage and dividend yield. We find similar results here. Table 4 shows that companies with high Fortune scores had larger capitalization, lower book-to-market ratios, lower earning-toprice ratios, lower cash-flows-to-price ratios, higher past sales growth and higher past stock returns. Electric, is are among the top-10 companies by the ranking of industry-affiliated respondents. Moreover, as noted earlier, mean ratings in some industries are higher on average than those of other industries. Ranking companies with no adjustment for such differences favors the private information of executives and analysts of higher ranked industries over others. The top-10 companies in the three lists are presented in Table 5 .
Our results are inconsistent with the private information hypothesis. Table 6 shows that dispersion was higher in the Industry-Adjusted Despised portfolio than in the Industry-Adjusted Admired portfolio in all but two of the twenty-three years. The average dispersion in the Industry-Adjusted Despised portfolio during the 23 years was 39.96% while that in the Industry-Adjusted Admired portfolio was only 29.77%.
Performance evaluation
The 17.84% mean annualized return of the Industry-Adjusted Despised portfolio was higher than the 15.35% mean of the Industry-Adjusted Admired portfolio, but so was its volatility. Still, the higher return of the Industry-Adjusted Despised portfolio more than compensated for its higher volatility. The Sharpe ratio of the Industry-Adjusted
Despised portfolio was 0.19, higher by 0.02 than the Sharpe ratio of the IndustryAdjusted Admired portfolio. (See Table 7) The advantage of the Industry-Adjusted Despised portfolios over the IndustryAdjusted Admired portfolio is also evident when we evaluate performance by the CAPM 
Investor behavior and stock returns
We admire a stock or despise it when we hear its name, whether Google or General Motors, before we think about its price-to-earnings ratio or the growth of its company's sales. Stocks, like houses, cars, watches and most other products exude affect, good or bad, beautiful or ugly, admired or despised. Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2002) described the importance of affect in guiding judgments and decisions. They wrote that affect, the specific quality of 'goodness' or 'badness,' is a feeling that occurs rapidly and automatically, often without consciousness. Zajonc (1980) , an early proponent of the importance of affect in decision making wrote, " We do not just see house: We see a handsome house, an ugly house, or a pretentious house" (p.
154) and added "We sometimes delude ourselves that we proceed in a rational manner and weight all the pros and cons of the various alternatives. But this is probably seldom the actual case. Quite often 'I decided in favor of X' is not more than the "I liked X'. We buy the cars we 'like," choose the jobs and houses we find 'attractive,' and then justify Investors in stocks of admired companies received lower returns than investors in stocks of despised companies.
We hypothesize that affect tilts the ratings of the Fortune respondents toward admired companies and find evidence consistent with this hypothesis. We asked 501
investors, high net-worth clients of an investment company, to complete a questionnaire listing only the names of companies and a 10-point scale ranging from "bad" to "good".
The questionnaire said: "Look at the name of the company and quickly rate the feeling associated with it on a scale ranging from bad to good. Don't spend time thinking about the rating. Just go with your quick, intuitive feeling." The affect score of a company is the mean score assigned to it by the surveyed investors. Earlier, Shefrin and Statman (1995) attributed the preference for admired companies to representativeness, a cognitive bias. Kahneman and Tversky (1973) described represnetativeness bias as the tendency to assess likelihood by representativeness of features. For example, people tend to conclude that a man with features more representative of a stereotypical engineer than a stereotypical lawyer is more likely to be an engineer than a lawyer even when they are told that the population from which the man is drawn contains many more lawyers than engineers.
One manifestation of representativeness is a tendency to extrapolate from the past to the future. For example, Fisher and Statman (2000) found that individual investors tend to extrapolate past stock returns, becoming bullish after periods of high stock returns. This is true here as well. Past returns are higher among stocks in the IndustryAdjusted Admired portfolio than among stocks in the Industry-Adjusted Despised portfolio. (See Table 4) We do not have a conclusive test of the relative powers of affect and representativeness in the preference for stocks of admired companies. It might be that the two work in tandem where, in the words of Slovic et al, affect lubricates reason.
However, the high correlation between the affect scores of companies and their Fortune scores gives the edge to affect. Investors assigned affect score with no explicit knowledge of past returns or other features of companies and their stocks, yet the correlation between affect scores and Fortune scores is high.
Investor preferences and stock returns
The road from the preference of most investor for stock of admired companies to the lower return of such stocks is not straight, as explained by Shefrin and Statman (1995) and more recently by Pontiff (2006) . Suppose that most investors are indeed noise traders who believe, erroneously, that good stocks are stocks of good companies.
But surely not all investors are noise traders. Some investors are information traders, aware of the biases of noise traders and seek to capitalize on them by investing as "contrarians," favoring stock of despised companies. Would information traders not nullify any effect of noise traders on security prices through arbitrage? If the effects of noise traders on stock returns are nullified, risk adjusted expected returns to stocks of admired companies would be no different from risk-adjusted expected returns to stocks of despised companies. However, if arbitrage is incomplete, risk-adjusted expected returns to stocks of despised companies will exceed risk adjusted expected returns to stocks of admired companies.
As we consider arbitrage and the likelihood that it would nullify the effects of the preferences of noise traders on stock price, we should note that no perfect (risk-free)
arbitrage is possible here. To see the implications of imperfect arbitrage, imagine information traders who receive reliable, but not perfect, information about the expected return of a particular stock. Imagine also that the nature of the information is such that the expected return of the stock as assessed by information traders is higher than the expected return as reflected in the current price of the stock. It is optimal for information traders to increase their holdings of the particular stock, but as the amount devoted to the stock increases, their portfolios become less diversified as they take on more idiosyncratic risk. The increase in risk leads information traders to limit the amount allocated to the stock, and with it, limit their effect on its price. Indeed, the great periodto-period variation in the relative returns of the Admired and Despised portfolios indicates that idiosyncratic risk is high. However, we do not know if returns of stocks of admired companies would exceed those of despised companies in the next year, the next decade or the next 23 years. We find that the relative returns of stocks of admired and despised companies varied considerably from year to year and from decade to decade. Stocks of admired companies were the winners in some periods and losers in other periods. Moreover, the relationship between admiration and returns is not always monotonic. Investors lose some of the benefits of diversification when they tilt their portfolios toward stocks of admired companies or despised ones and they must balance the potential benefits of tilts against these losses. 1 1 Quality of a company is the mean rating on the 7 company attributes in the Fortune survey, quality of management; quality of products or services; innovativeness; financial soundness; ability to attract, develop, and keep talented people; responsibility to the community and the environment; and wise use of corporate assets. Investment value is the rating on the attribtue of long term investment value. 
Conclusion

